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THE SUPREME COURT, DEMOCRACY AND
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION
ROSS SANDLER* & DAVID SCHOENBROD**
In an unexpected portion of its unanimous 2004 opinion in
Frew v. Hawkins,1 a challenge by Texas officials to an institutional
reform consent decree, the U.S. Supreme Court broke new ground
in the effort to protect democratic control of state and local government as well as rights. The Texas officials wanted to get out from
under the consent decree. The Supreme Court refused, but in its
opinion the Court criticized unnecessarily rigid consent decrees,
cautioned judges that consent decrees may undermine democracy
and flexibility in government, and admonished judges to be more
flexible when officials ask to modify the terms of existing consent
decrees.2 The press ignored the opinion or presented it as a boost
for public interest plaintiffs using courts to reform state and local
social programs.3 Yet, the opinion actually points in the opposite
direction, telling federal courts to refrain from intruding on the
policymaking prerogatives of governors, mayors, and their legislative counterparts unless necessary to protect rights.
Abram Chayes, in his ground breaking article, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation published in 1976, recognized that
consent decrees have an undemocratic nature that must neverthe* Professor and Director, Center for New York City Law, New York Law School;
LL.B. New York University School of Law, 1965; A.B. Dartmouth, 1961.
** Professor, New York Law School; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1968; B.A. Yale University, 1963. We thank Marci Hamilton and David I. Levine for their comments on an
early draft, and Nathan Ajiashvili and Ryan Sestack, New York Law School, class of 2005,
for their research assistance.
1. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
2. Frew, 540 U.S. at 439-42.
3. A search of the New York Times’ Web site turned up no articles pertaining to
Frew v. Hawkins (search conducted July 22, 2004). The Wall Street Journal reported that
the Court had rejected the defendants’ immunity argument, but not that it had made it
easier to modify decrees. See Robert S. Greenberger, Consent Decrees May be Enforced on
State Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at A6. Newsday got the case entirely wrong,
reporting that “the U.S. Supreme Court made it more difficult yesterday for state officials to renege on court-approved promises.” Court: States Can’t Renege, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15,
2004, at A16.
915
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less be tolerated as an inevitable and undesirable feature of institutional reform litigation.4 Chayes concluded that the antidemocratic consequences were acceptable because the outcomes as
he saw them had been good, and because judges who would be in
charge of reforms would be restrained by institutional factors
within the judicial culture, such as the general expectation as to
competence and conscientiousness, professional traditions, and accepted canons of office.5
More than a quarter century later, it is clear that the judges are
not really in charge and the outcomes are sometimes strikingly bad.
Under many consent decrees, effective control of the state or local
governmental institution is shifted from elected officials to an ad
hoc group of lawyers that writes and administers the judicial regime—we call them the “controlling group.” Consent decrees are
plagued by unintended consequences, yet are difficult to modify in
light of experience and changing circumstances. It is not unusual
for consent decrees to control a state or local agency for 20 or 30
years, and even then, there may be no end in sight.6 It was to these
concerns that the Supreme Court turned in Frew v. Hawkins.
I. THE FREW V. HAWKINS LITIGATION
Frew v. Hawkins began in 1993 when private lawyers filed a suit
alleging that Texas officials failed to give children their due under
the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program of the federal Medicaid statute.7 Plaintiffs’ lawyers and state
officials drafted a decree that dictated how the Texas officials would
provide health care for the more than 1.5 million children who
might qualify for Medicaid. The decree was submitted to the district judge on consent and he signed it. The consent decree was, as
the Supreme Court later put it, “a detailed document about 80
pages long that orders a comprehensive plan for implementing the
federal statute. In contrast with the brief and general mandate of
the statute itself, the consent decree requires the state officials to
4.
5.
6.
HAPPENS
7.

89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
Id. at 1313-16.
We have described these issues in our book, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY BY DECREE].
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(43), 1396d(r).

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR307.txt

2005]

unknown

Seq: 3

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

25-APR-05

7:46

917

implement many specific procedures.” There was no judicial finding that the state had violated the statute.8
In 1998, lawyers for the plaintiff class went back to the judge to
complain that Texas failed to live up to some particulars of the decree. The Texas officials responded that the state was complying
with the statute, but the plaintiffs’ lawyers argued that this was not
enough since the decree had added many other duties. The district
judge ruled that the state must comply with the decree, even if it
were in compliance with the statute, and ordered the officials to
come up with a yet more detailed plan.9 Such a plan would have to
be negotiated with the plaintiffs’ lawyers, a process that would further tighten their control exercised in the name of the court.
Instead of negotiating, the Texas officials appealed, taking the
unprecedented position that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution immunized them from enforcement of the extra obligations in the consent decree. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eleventh Amendment to allow suits against state officials that
violate federal law,10 but the Texas officials claimed that their compliance with the federal statute, although not the federal decree,
rendered them immune. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Texas
officials’ immunity argument and refused to enforce the decree,11
but the Supreme Court took the case and, in an unanimous opinion, reversed, holding that once the Texas officials had agreed to
the consent decree, it was fully enforceable. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Court, reasoned that since such decrees can
lawfully be entered, they can be enforced: “Federal courts are not
reduced to approving consent decrees and hoping for
compliance.”12
This holding disposed of the case, but the Court extended its
opinion with an additional section, wholly dictum, to discuss another issue: what should judges do when an expansive decree exceeds statutory requirements and so lets private lawyers dictate to
8. Frew, 540 U.S. at 434-37. While the district court did not find Texas in violation
of the federal statute, it did certify the plaintiff class, which then led to the negotiations
and the consent decree.
9. See Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 665-78 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
10. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
11. See Frazar v. Ladd, 300 F.3d 530, 537, 540-44, 550-51 (5th Cir. 2002).
12. Frew, 540 U.S. at 440.
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elected officials? The Court, agreeing with the amicus briefs filed
by the attorneys general of nineteen states, wrote that “enforcement
of consent decrees can undermine the sovereign interests and accountability of state governments.” Although officials consent to
the entry of decrees in the first place, they tie not only their own
hands, but those of their successors in office into the indefinite future. The upshot, the Court stated, is that “[i]f not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, remedies
outlined in consent decrees. . . may improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers” and lead
“to federal court oversight of state programs for long periods of
time even absent an ongoing violation of federal law.”13
The Court then identified the proper response to decrees that
exceed requirements of federal law: grant motions by governmental
defendants to modify them. This, the Frew opinion stated, they
could do, because Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,14 the Court’s
1992 opinion, held that in institutional reform cases “district courts
should apply a ‘flexible standard’ to the modification of consent
decrees when a significant change in facts or law warrants their
amendment.”15 The Frew dictum then went on at length to describe the deference that district judges owe elected officials in considering their motions for modification.16
We wondered why the Court included such extended dictum
on modification if all it was doing was restating the standard from
Rufo. The reason, we suggest, is that the modification standard set
out in Rufo had in practice proved too inflexible and Frew
presented an opportunity to reshape it. Consent decrees rarely get
to the Supreme Court because, by consenting, officials waive their
right to appeal. If their successors in office are later charged with
violating the decree, the collateral bar rule prevents them from
challenging the validity of the decree in the enforcement proceeding. Officials may, however, move to modify the decree, but the
Rufo standard itself makes it hard to succeed.17 The Texas officials
attempted to get around these impediments by invoking the Elev13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 441.
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
Frew, 540 U.S. at 441.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
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enth Amendment, a strategy that the Court demolished. As weak as
the Texas officials’ case was, it nonetheless brought before the Supreme Court a consent decree in an institutional reform case, and
in the twelve years since it had published the Rufo opinion the
Court had not heard another case where reconsideration of the
standard for modification was even tangentially relevant.18 The
Court, we suggest, seized the opportunity to revise its 1992 opinion
in Rufo.
The Frew dictum presents this discussion as a restatement of
Rufo, but Frew in fact stakes out a new position that should make it
easier for governmental officials to obtain judicial approval when
they seek to modify and terminate an existing consent decree.
II. RUFO V. INMATES

OF

SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL

AND

ITS LIMITS

In 1971, Suffolk County, which includes Boston, housed its
prisoners awaiting trial in the Charles Street Jail under conditions
that did not meet constitutional standards. The prisoners sued in
federal court, the judge ruled for them, and in 1973 the judge ordered the end of double bunking prisoners in cells and the closing
of the jail by 1976. The county failed to meet the deadlines, but the
parties in 1978 consented to a decree that included a commitment
to end double bunking and a promise to construct a new jail with
cells designed for single occupants. In 1989, after much delay and
two modifications, just as the new jail was about to be opened, the
county sheriff sought another modification to allow double bunking at the new jail on the theory that the Supreme Court had in the
interim made clear that single bunking is not constitutionally re18. A search of the Supreme Court database from Rufo to Frew for the terms
“Rufo” or “consent decree” brought up only five cases in which the Supreme Court
dealt with consent decrees that had been entered against governmental defendants.
Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997), and City of Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters
Ass’n, 526 U.S. 1046 (1999), dealt with challenges to the entry of decrees by persons
who had not consented to their entry; they did not deal with the modification, enforcement or termination of consent decrees. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999), dealt
with attorney’s fees. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000), dealt with whether the automatic stay provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act was constitutional. Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overruled a prior Supreme Court decision upon which the
decree in the case had been based and, on the basis of that overruling, ordered that the
decree be vacated. Agostini provided no occasion to reconsider Rufo because the Court
ruled that Rufo itself dictated the vacation of the decree.
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quired. The district court judge refused to allow the modification,
and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court took the
case and in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, reversed, with six
Justices agreeing that the trial judge had evaluated the modification
motion by the county sheriff on too rigid a standard. The Court
sent the motion back to the trial court, and in doing so set out a
new, less rigid standard for modification of consent decrees.
The prior standard governing a motion for the modification of
a consent decree dated from 1932, and held that “Nothing less than
a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
circumstance should lead us to change what was decreed after years
of litigation with the consent of all concerned.”19 This was a very
tough standard designed to give finality to settlements. Rufo discarded the grievous wrong standard in institutional reform cases
and looked instead to whether an “unforeseen” change in the factual circumstances had the effect of making compliance with the
decree substantially more onerous. Otherwise, the decree could be
changed only in extraordinary circumstances.20
In reasoning why a new standard was needed, the Court in
Rufo distinguished private disputes settled by agreement from consent decrees in institutional reform cases. The Court wrote that in
institutional reform cases decrees may remain in place for a very
long time, a factor that increases the likelihood of changed circumstances, and that the obligations imposed by decrees affect not only
the parties, but also the public at large.21
19. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). This statement regarding the Swift opinion suffices for the purposes of this essay, but the story is actually more
complicated. As Rufo observed, a showing of grievous wrong caused by unforeseen circumstance was not the only way to get a decree changed, even under Swift. Rufo, 502
U.S. at 378-80. See also Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-48
(1991). For a more complete account of Swift and its aftermath, see David I. Levine, The
Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The Course of Institutional Reform Cases After
Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 579 (1993).
20. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384. “If it is clear that a party anticipated changing conditions that would make performance of the decree more onerous but nevertheless
agreed to the decree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince a
court that it agreed to the decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply
with the decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b).” Id. at
385.
21. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380-81.

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR307.txt

2005]

unknown

Seq: 7

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

25-APR-05

7:46

921

Rufo’s unforeseen circumstances requirement calls for a factual
inquiry into the circumstances and knowledge of the parties at the
time that they made their deal. It is a near cousin of the common
law contract doctrine that excuses non-performance as a result of
supervening impracticability.22 The contractual analogy is apt because the Supreme Court had written elsewhere that plaintiffs had
the right to specific performance of the terms of the decree.23
Rufo bears other indicia of contractual thinking. It states that a
modification to a consent decree should be tailored to resolve the
problems created by the change in circumstance and should not
strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the “constitutional floor.”24 The effect of this principle is to preserve the initial bargain to the extent practicable. The Court also stated that
the trial court must not defer to state and local officials in deciding
whether a modification is warranted.25 Deference is of course required when judges review how officials exercise their discretionary
powers, but not in enforcing contracts.
None of these indicia of contractual thinking got into the Rufo
opinion by accident. The unforeseen circumstances requirement
was the main issue over which the justices split in Rufo. Two Justices
wanted a more restrictive requirement—that the changes be unforeseeable as well, thus charging the parties with knowledge of all
future events that reasonably prudent litigants settling a case would
foresee.26 The parallel requirement that the modification be tailored to the change in circumstance was itself the subject of a separate section of the opinion.27 The demand that the trial judge not
defer to defendant officials, although dealt within a footnote, was

22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
23. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 607 (1984). Similar contract thinking is reflected in the Supreme Court’s standard for terminating decrees that is geared to compliance with the decree rather than compliance with the law
that it is ostensibly meant to enforce. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
24. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
25. Id. at 393 n.14 (forbidding deference in deciding whether modification is warranted, but requiring deference in crafting the terms of any modification that is
warranted).
26. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 406-09.
27. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391-93.
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the subject of an exchange between the majority and the
concurrence.28
Rufo did make it somewhat easier for defendant officials to
modify decrees, but the contract principles upon which it was built
put severe limits on the ability of officials to gain relief from decree
provisions unnecessary to protect plaintiffs’ rights, even when those
provisions might seem unwise in light of experience and the changing wishes of voters.
Without agreement from plaintiffs’ attorneys, officials faced
substantial litigation obstacles in order to secure modifications even
with a change of circumstances that met the unforeseen test. For
example, in a case involving eviction procedures from public housing in New York City, the parties litigated for 18 months whether
the advent of crack cocaine was sufficiently different from ordinary
cocaine and heroin to meet the Rufo test of an unforeseen circumstance, and whether the proposed plan to evict crack dealers who
used their public housing apartments for the sale of crack was suitably tailored to the new circumstance.29 In a Massachusetts consent
decree case involving the incarceration of sexual offenders, it took
four years and three trips to the First Circuit to work out the modifications. The First Circuit in the last of the three opinions expressed the hope that the parties could work things out without
more “heroic” litigation over further modifications of the 26-yearold consent decree.30 In Rufo itself, the district court on remand
from the Supreme Court denied the modification that would have
allowed double bunking after intensive litigation involving several
months of discovery, an evidentiary hearing and briefing, and a day
of oral argument. The judge ruled that the sheriff’s proposed modification was not suitably tailored to the problem presented by the
substantial increase in the number of prisoners.31
28. Id. at 393 n.14; Id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined
Justice Stevens in dissent.
29. See Escalera v. New York Housing Authority, 924 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
30. See King v. Greenblatt, 52 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995); remanded to 127 F.3d 190 (1st
Cir. 1997); aff’d, 149 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1998). The consent decree finally terminated
in 1999. See King v. Greenblatt, 53 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999).
31. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 148 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1993). A
year later, after more litigation, the judge allowed a partial modification on double
bunking. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 844 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1994).
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RUFO

Frew, in contrast to Rufo, omits any mention of contract thinking. There was no statement that there must be an unforeseen
change, that the modification must be tailored to the change, or
that the trial judge need not defer to defendant officials on
whether to modify.
Were these omissions accidental, or do they presage a shift to a
new approach to modifications of consent decrees in institutional
reform cases? We think that they do presage a shift. The Justices
instruct trial judges to ensure that “state officials with front-line responsibility for administering the [federal] program be given latitude and substantial discretion.”32 The reason is that “a state . . .
depends upon successor officials, both elected and appointed, to
bring new insights and solutions to problems of allocating revenues
and resources.”33 This formulation would seem to allow a newly
elected official to secure a modification based on considerations
that were in fact foreseen by the predecessor who consented to the
decree, but which the successor now evaluates differently.
Justice Kennedy wrote that “Rufo rejected the idea that the institutional concerns of government officials were ‘only marginally
relevant’ when officials moved to amend a consent decree, and
noted that ‘principles of federalism and simple common sense require the [district] court to give significant weight’ to the views of
government officials.”34 In the penultimate sentences of the
Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded by stating that “The
basic obligations of federal law may remain the same, but the precise manner of their discharge may not. If the State establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should make the necessary
changes; where it has not done so, however, the decree should be
enforced to its terms.”35
IV. FREW

AND

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

This last statement by Justice Kennedy is consistent with one of
the most basic principles of municipal law that holds that neither a
32.
33.
34.
35.

Frew, 540 U.S. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
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government nor its officials may contract away the power to govern.
As Justice Brennan wrote on another occasion,
One of the fundamental premises of our popular democracy is that each generation of representatives can and
will remain responsive to the needs and desires of those
whom they represent. Crucial to this end is the assurance
that new legislators will not automatically be bound by the
policies and undertakings of earlier days. . . . [N]othing
would so jeopardize the legitimacy of [our] system of government that relies upon the ebbs and flows of politics to
“clean out the rascals” than the possibility that those same
rascals might perpetuate their policies simply by locking
them into binding contracts.36

An exception is made so that government may make enforceable
contracts of a proprietary nature, such as to purchase supplies or
borrow money, but the decrees in institutional reform cases clearly
fall on the government side of the governmental-proprietary line
because their avowed purpose is to change how government
functions.
It is possible to understand in retrospect how the courts came
to think of consent decrees against government in contract terms,
and why it may now be edging away from that way of thinking. The
classic opinion to cite for the proposition that consent decrees are,
in part, a contract came in an antitrust case against a large private
corporation.37 In such a case, there could be no concern with government contracting away its governmental powers because, obviously, the defendant was not a government. A private corporation
is unlikely to consent to a decree broader than what a judge would
impose as necessary to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights. The cases where
institutional reform litigation took root, however, involved school
desegregation and prison conditions in which officials often resisted constitutional rights. Faced with such resistance, a trial
judge’s last concern would be that the defendants would consent to

36. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See United States v. ITT Continental Banking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975).
See also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971).
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a decree that went beyond the constitutional floor.38 To allow easy
modification of deals that defendants struck in cases tinged by massive resistance would be to invite yet more resistance. It often took
years to pin officials down on a plan to correct their ways. If they
could change those plans in the name of having thought up a better way to comply with the law, defiant officials would have yet another way to further postpone compliance.
Rufo came out of this line of cases. It was about the rights of
inmates, the violation was constitutional, and the defendants had
been uncooperative. The lower court found that the county jail fell
short of constitutional standards, but, for years afterwards, the defendants failed to remedy the violation.39 Rufo thus had an odor of
official resistance to the minimal obligations of constitutional law.
By the time Rufo had reached the Supreme Court, the resistance
had abated and the defendants were in the midst of building a new
jail designed to bring them into compliance. The Court nevertheless saw itself as adopting a standard for all institutional reform
cases, and the justices who took the toughest line on modification
placed the most emphasis on the history of resistance in the case.40
Frew, on the other hand, looked at the intersection between
democracy and institutional reform litigation in a much different
factual setting. In Frew, the alleged violations were statutory and
the defendants generally cooperative. State officials had agreed to
a program that satisfied the plaintiffs’ lawyers without the court
finding a violation. Although the defendants subsequently did not
comply with some provisions of the decree, Texas was, according to
the Fifth Circuit, spending more than any other state on outreach
programs, was unaware of even a single individual who had requested health services and not subsequently received them, and
was in compliance with the statute itself.41
The Frew dictum reads as if attuned to this different setting.
Justice Kennedy wrote that overly rigid management of consent de38. Not everyone on the defendants’ side sought to resist; as Malcolm Feeley and
Edward Rubin point out, some prison officials seized upon the litigation to increase
funding. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 62-63 (1998).
39. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 372-76.
40. Id. at 407-09.
41. See Frazar, 300 F.3d at 533, 548.
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crees may improperly deprive future office holders of their designated legislative powers. It may also lead to overly long federal
court oversight of state programs and to the ignoring by federal
judges of institutional concerns by state and local officials, as well as
to an insufficient recognition of the latitude and discretion required by state officials who are managing the program. These,
Frew says, are all concerns properly considered by a judge sitting in
equity.42
Frew shifts from an approach in which contract considerations
are used to pin down recalcitrant state and local officials to a new
approach where officials have broad discretion so long as they work
in good faith to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights. But, what test does Frew
put in place of unforeseen circumstance and modifications tailored
to them? Frew does not say. In this, the Frew dictum is similar to
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Rufo. She concurred in
sending the case back to the trial court for a reconsideration of the
motion to modify the consent decree because she believed that the
district court judge had impermissibly restricted his discretion. Yet,
she thought that the new standard as articulated by the majority in
Rufo would in the end also be too restrictive since it relied on a
formula rather than the sound discretion of the judge overseeing
the decree.43
The Frew approach is more consistent with the realities of most
institutional reform litigation today. In contemporary cases, the
emphasis is on enforcing statutory and regulatory rights rather than
constitutional ones. Dozens of federal statutes have launched hundreds of federal agency regulations imposing thousands of court
enforceable mandates on state and local government. Given the
number and specificity of these mandates and their tendency to set
aspirational standards for state and local government, it is no great
trick for private advocates to discover some aspect of a large state or
local program that falls short, be it Medicaid, special education, environmental protection, or foster care.44
Governors and mayors thus have few defenses to a lawsuit
charging them with illegally neglecting service to their constituents.
42.
43.
44.

Frew, 540 U.S. at 441.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 395-99.
See discussion in DEMOCRACY

BY

DECREE, supra note 6, at 17-28.
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Some might argue that the violations occur because state and local
officials set taxes too low or fail to act high-mindedly. Others might
argue that the violations occur because the rights reflect opportunism in Congress rather than society’s sense of priorities. No sensible person could argue, however, that the violations typically occur
because of the kind of massive resistance that marked the early
school desegregation cases. The majority of southern voters opposed the objective of desegregation while, in contrast, the majority
of voters everywhere favor the objectives of the new federal rights.
That is why Congress enacts them, often with the support of the
very mayors and governors who end up in court as violators.
Enforcing such rights presents difficult judicial choices because it is often not obvious how or when the state or local government could comply. Trial judges thus urge the parties to work it
out. The result is that plaintiffs’ attorneys, government’s attorneys,
and officials in direct charge of the program meet around a large
table. This “controlling group” agrees on a plan for running the
program and presents it to the judge whose signature turns it into a
consent decree. The plan tends to track the ideas of the controlling group about how to run the program and need not stick precisely to the requirements of federal law. The plan, as in Frew itself,
often requires benefits in excess of the federal rights and usually
dictates how the program shall deliver whatever benefits are required. Officials in charge of the program tend to welcome the
opportunity to write such requirements into the decree because the
decree then lets them shoehorn more money and authority away
from governors, mayors, and legislatures. Governors and mayors
generally share the goals of the litigation; they desire to avoid being
labeled as lawbreakers and to be seen instead as problem solvers.
They cannot reliably be depended upon to withhold consent from
decrees that set out obligations in excess of, or different from, the
federal statute, or which imposes details of compliance and milestones that would under other circumstances be left to the managers of the program. In some cases officials use the consent decree
process to shift to their successors the most burdensome changes.45

45. The logic compelling officials to consent in institutional reform cases is discussed in id. at 122, 167-74.
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The result may be fine for the governor or mayor consenting,
but not for their successors in office and their constituents. The
well-intentioned plans written into the decrees rarely work exactly
as planned or they may bring about consequences that were foreseen, but, upon reflection, would be better avoided.46 Yet, at least
until Frew, the Supreme Court’s standard for modification made
any change difficult if not impossible. Defendants often need
plaintiffs’ consent to modify the decree. Plaintiffs’ lawyers can use
the threat to litigate to exact new obligations. Decrees that begin at
fifty or eighty pages grow in length to hundreds and even
thousands of pages, and thus become increasingly difficult to escape.47 That was the course upon which Texas was headed in Frew
until the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court, each in its own way,
intervened.
Frew closes a gap in the jurisprudence that governs remedies in
institutional reform cases. The Supreme Court has long permitted
state and local officials broad flexibility when designing the original
consent decree.48 Officials could at the start extend obligations,
substitute new ones, or eliminate statutory obligations altogether.
Prison cases, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say, may start
by challenging brutality and end with decrees specifying the square
footage of cells, the temperature of food in the dining room, and
the availability of televison and movies.49 But when it came to modifying these same obligations, the Rufo test proved less flexible, resulting in a loss of democratic accountability. With Frew, that gap is
gone.
Still it will be hard for judges to follow the guidance of Frew.
The way in which modification motions usually present themselves
appear to call for a toughness by the judge not demanded at the
46. See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (involving bunking of prisoners); Alliance
to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving restrictions placed on FBI when investigating alleged terrorist groups).
47. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a
prison reform case that was settled in 1978 with a consent decree of 52 pages that grew
over the next 25 years to more than several hundred pages; the consent decree was
partially terminated pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2003)).
48. See Local No. 93, Int’l. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
525 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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time of the initial consent. In the initial negotiations, every effort is
made to reach agreement to avoid litigation. Later, judicial flexibility disappears and in its place appears a hardness and desire to hold
the defendants’ feet to the fire. As former federal judge Marvin
Frankel said concerning his role as a special master at the beginning of an institutional reform case involving special education,
“My job was to get an agreement,” because in complex cases, “you
rely on the parties to work it out. ”50 But Special Master Frankel was
much less flexible three years into the case when the consent decree’s complex plan for evaluating, placing, and teaching 100,000
children with special needs proved difficult, costly, and largely unworkable, and produced many unwanted side effects. He then
wrote that “[t]he time has come, it is now believed, for defendants
either to comply with the judgements or to confront the familiar
consequences of noncompliance. . . . Demanding respect for their
expertise, defendants ought to get it. Promising compliance, they
ought to achieve it or face contempt charges.”51
The Frew dictum, made in a context of a motion for contempt,
speaks to this reality by instructing judges and litigants that they are
not to forget the values associated with local democracy and flexibility, nor the difficult reality or costs of social change. Judges walk a
fine line when affirmatively dictating how government will deliver
its services. The Frew dictum, if followed, shifts the judicial balance
toward democratic values and away from contractual rigidity.52
50. Interview with Judge Marvin E. Frankel in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 8, 1999).
Judge Frankel served as the court-appointed special master in Jose P. v. Ambach, No.79
Civ. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
51. Jose P. v. Ambach, Special Master Rep. No. 12, at 5-6 (Sept. 7, 1982).
52. At least one court appears to read Frew as commanding more deference when
state officials seek to modify a consent order. In Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Posner, writing for the panel, cited Frew in
reversing a district court’s award of fees to plaintiffs’ counsel who had opposed modification of a fifteen-year-old consent decree. Judge Posner, quoting Frew’s discussion concerning the potentially anti-democratic nature of consent decrees, wrote that plaintiffs
had “no duty—statutory, contractual or ethical—to oppose modification.” Plaintiffs’
opposition to the modification “verged on the unreasonable” because “the circumstances out of which the class action suit had arisen had changed dramatically when
modification was sought. The decree in its original form had accomplished its purpose
and had become obsolete. There would have been no ignominy to the plaintiffs’ acceding to the modification.” Id. at 773-74. In contrast, in denying a motion for modification, the Ninth Circuit extensively cited the holding of Frew that decrees that go beyond
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FROM

We had been following the Frew litigation and had mentioned
the lower court decision in our book, Democracy by Decree, as an example of a consent order that was broader than the right it enforced.53 We had no faith that the Texas officials’ Eleventh
Amendment attack on the authority of a federal court to enforce
such an order, but we did suspect that the decision to be made by
the Supreme Court might have an impact on federal courts growing control of state and local programs through long-lasting and
rigid consent decrees.
Our book was published a year before the Supreme Court’s
decision and was written without benefit of the Court’s dictum, but
in it we made a similar argument against judicial control broader
than necessary to enforce rights. We contended in our book that
consent decrees not only shift control from democratically elected
officials to the controlling group, but also in many cases do more
harm than good. Because of their breadth and rigidity, decrees
often have unwanted side effects.54 We acknowledged that courts
were obligated to enforce rights, but suggested new rules to minimize the adverse effects on democracy and government programs.
Our suggestions concerned the way courts review and approve consent decrees, consider applications by officials to modify decrees,
and prepare the way to terminate consent decrees within a reasonable period of time.55
While the Supreme Court’s dictum in Frew has been ignored in
the legal academic and popular literature, our book with its similar
reasoning was not. It provoked substantial comment in scholarly
publications, newspapers, and other periodicals.56 In surveying
the requirements of federal law are enforceable against state officials, but ignored the
dictum easing modification. See Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004).
53. DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 110.
54. Id. at Chapters 4, 5 & 6.
55. Id. at Chapters 8 & 9.
56. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Book Review, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 679, 680-81
(Winter 2003-04); Matthew J. Franck, Coercion by Consent, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Summer 2004, at 55; Jonathan Kay, Soft rights, COMMENTARY, Jan. 2003, at 62; George C.
Leef, The Imperial Bench, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 69; Thomas J. Main, Closed Doors,
Open Season, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at D4; Susan Poser, What’s a Judge to Do? Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307 (2004); Charles F.
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these responses, most striking to us was that all of the writers accepted our description of how institutional reform litigation works
in practice, including our point that the controlling group led by
the plaintiffs’ lawyers aggregates power far in excess of that needed
to protect rights. Susan Rose-Ackerman found convincing our account of a process “that flies in the face of democratic accountability at the state and local level.”57 Susan Poser, although critical of
some of our recommendations, applies such words as “subtle,” “persuasively,” and “powerfully” to our description. She concludes that
we “make a compelling point that institutional reform litigation
takes political decisions out of the hands of elected representatives
and puts them into the hands of the controlling group, made up
primarily of unelected, unaccountable, partisan lawyers.”58
Some commentators also found merit in our recommendations. Rose-Ackerman, for example, found them by and large “sensible.”59 A reviewer in the Washington Post praised the book’s
viewpoint, calling it “refreshing.”60 Some commentators, however,
attacked some of our suggestions in terms that could have been
equally addressed to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Frew.
The attacks came on three fronts: (1) any restrictions on the use of
consent decrees to advance social agendas would leave rights unprotected; (2) restrictions on the use of consent decrees presume
an unwarranted trust in state and local officials; and (3) restrictions, if any, should be aimed at Congress rather than well-intentioned lawyers and judges.

Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); Jonathan Shapiro, Do We need Less Activism from the Bench or
More? Four New Books Judge the State of Our Judiciary, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2003, at T06;
Ilya Somin, Democracy & Judicial Review Revisited: The New Old Critique of Judicial Power, 7
GREENBAG 287 (2003); Mark Tushnet, “Sir, Yes, Sir”: The Courts, Congress, and Structural
Injunctions, 20 CONST. COM. 189 (2003); Ross Weiner, The Corrosive Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 33; George Will, Judges and Soft Rights, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28,
2005, at 70; David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
57. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 56, at 680-81.
58. Poser, supra note 56, at 1318.
59. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 56, at 681.
60. Shapiro, supra note 56.
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A. Rights Would Not Go Unprotected
This first criticism is the one most powerfully urged by those
supporting institutional reform litigation. Danny Greenberg, former head of New York City’s Legal Aid Society, declared our book
to be “dangerous” because it might lead to a judicial abandonment
of the poor and defenseless.61 Susan Poser charged that we “tell
federal judges to stop fashioning remedies when state and local government officials break the law by violating the rights of individuals.”62 Mark Tushnet, in his agitated attack on the book, accused us
of rolling back federal rights.63 Such criticism misreads—indeed,
wildly misreads—our position, and would, if directed at the Supreme Court’s dictum in Frew, equally miss the mark.
The Supreme Court emphatically held that judges are not free
to ignore rights. That was the precise holding of Frew as the Court
unanimously brushed aside arguments by Texas officials that they
benefitted from a constitutional shield against judicial enforcement
of court orders. It was the Court’s resounding rejection of the
Texas position that led it to discuss how judges should proceed
when officials, who are bound to comply with federal rights, seek to
modify a consent decree designed to achieve those rights. Here the
Supreme Court spoke both emphatically and didactically: defer to
the state and local officials as they maneuver within their legal options to achieve statutory rights, and do not tie them to duties and
dates of a contractual nature that earlier groups of plaintiffs and
defendants wrote into the consent decree.
We made a similar proposal in Democracy by Decree, urging that
modifications be allowed whenever the state and local officials have
a good reason to change how they will honor plaintiffs’ rights.64
Like the analysis in Frew, we suggested reasons why Rufo’s unforseen
61. Daniel Greenberg, Remarks during Panel on Institutional Reform Litigation
and Consent Decrees, Federal Bar Council (Nov. 6, 2003).
62. Poser, supra note 56, at 1309.
63. Tushnet, supra note 56.
64. DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 213-14. We made another proposal for
building flexibility into court enforcement of rights—that remedial obligations, but not
the finding of liability, can be changed when a new chief executive takes office. See id.
at 214. Poser reads us as calling for ending the remedial obligation. Poser, supra note
56, at 1321. But our proposal came in the section on modification, not termination, and
we meant that the decree be amended rather than ended.
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circumstances test for modifying consent decrees in institutional reform cases was too strict and that deference should be granted to
the officials charged with achieving plaintiffs’ rights.
There are difficult situations. Suppose that Congress or a federal agency acting under Congressional authority commands that a
program be completed by a deadline that most localities could not
meet. An example that we explored in Democracy by Decree involved
the installation of curb ramps under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. No large city in the country fully complied with the curb ramp
requirement. To have met the date would have wildly and unrealistically reallocated capital resources, and even then would have
failed. Or another example: a congressional command that local
governments achieve adoption for foster care children within fifteen months, a highly worthy goal, but one of great difficulty and
individual complexity.65
We called such rights “soft rights” because no court could insist
on literal compliance. Faced with a suit to enforce soft rights,
judges cannot ignore the right, but they also cannot enforce it precisely as written. So judges pass that buck to the controlling
group.66 Our recommendation for dealing with soft rights in this
situation was that the court should enter a judgement of violation,
but consider not issuing an affirmative decree. The effect of declaring a violation but not issuing an affirmative decree would be to
remand to the political branches the question of what is practical,
possible, and desirable to achieve the soft right, exactly where such
questions belong. As we wrote in our book, “if the body that
promulgated the impossible requirement—be it a legislature or an
agency—wants the courts to do more, it will have to make the necessary hard choices.”67
Our point is that federal judges should enforce choices made
by Congress and federal agencies (within whatever constitutional
limits there may be on delegation to agencies). But judges should
not step in to supplant state and local officials where Congress and
the agency have, as a practical matter, failed to make the choices or
particularize exactly how state and local officials are to achieve the
65.
66.
67.

DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 205.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 118–19.
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right. Otherwise, courts would be creating rights rather than enforcing them.
Poser claims we have failed to offer a judicially manageable test
to distinguish soft rights from hard rights.68 We defined “soft
rights” in terms of the well-recognized distinction between rights
and aspirations; “[w]e ‘honor’ rights, and in the general case, completely; we ‘pursue’ aspirations and, in the general case, attain them
only partially because they are idealistic.”69 We continued by observing that “A right is, after all, a right. Soft rights, on the other
hand, cannot ordinarily be fully achieved.”70 The result is that soft
rights “are enforced only to the extent that the controlling group or
the judge thinks it makes sense to do so in view of society’s competing priorities.”71 Poser overlooks our actual definition of soft
rights, and writes as if our definition was our discussion of why soft
68. Poser, supra note 56, at 1319-20. Poser offers another reason why she thinks we
advocate under enforcement of rights: she imagines that we flatly oppose the entry of
decrees imposing positive duties when needed prophylactically to protect rights. As she
puts it:
the line between stopping the violations and doing policymaking, or ensuring compliance and dictating how to comply, is not as clear as Sandler and
Schoenbrod suggest. Large public institutions like schools, prisons, and
hospitals violate rights by omissions and respect rights through positive acts,
such as creating livable conditions or providing special education. If the
plaintiffs can show that the defendants are violating their statutory right to
adequate special education, for example, then a negative injunction (stop
not giving special education) may not remedy the violation. To dismiss anything beyond a negative injunction as “policymaking,” and therefore illegitimate, simply evades the question of how plaintiffs in this context are
supposed to enforce their rights. Id. at 1320.
Her reading of us is bizarre. As we state, “[j]udges who stick to enforcing rights will still
have to consider taking hold of policy. Elected officials do not always obey simple, prohibitory injunctions . . . .” DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 204. We also say that
“judges should abstain from dictating the means to vindicate rights when defendants show that
they will work in good faith to meet their legal obligations.” Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
Our point is that trial judges should make their prophylactic decrees as narrow as possible consistent with protecting rights, but in no way precludes positive, prophylactic orders. It would be strange if our position were any different because one of us
(Schoenbrod) is recognized as providing a leading justification for including prophylactic provisions in injunctive relief. See Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 301,
303 n.5, 304 n.9, 333-35 & 371 (2004).
69. DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 100. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr.
& Richard A. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
70. DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 103.
71. Id. at 103.
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rights are more difficult to enforce than traditional ones.72 We
have a judicially manageable test, but she failed to engage it. The
Frew case itself presents an example of a soft right. The federal statute was brief, general, and aspirational.
We distinguished between soft rights and traditional rights to
clarify why consent decrees, managed by a controlling group of lawyers, can be so pernicious. If the federal statute, as in Frew, sets an
aspirational goal involving the health of 1.5 million children in
Texas, than filling in the blanks on how to achieve that federal goal
is no simple business. It is policymaking at the highest level since it
is the specific plans, programs and milestones written into the decree that drive the agency programs and expenditures. And it is
these requirements that do the most harm in undermining state
and local democracy.
Those who support consent decrees uncritically cannot allow
the distinction between soft rights and traditional rights to stand
unchallenged.73 They want soft rights to be treated in the identical
way that the courts treat traditional rights, but there are differences.
One reason is that soft rights are usually positive, while almost all
72. Poser, supra note 56, at 1318-20.
73. Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon in Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1078 n.175 (2004), argue that broad decrees
are necessary for plaintiffs interests to be heard. They write that we “argue that stakeholder participation is dominated by lawyers with little effective accountability to their
putative clients. [Sabel and Simon] find this argument implausible. It is specifically contradicted by many case histories recording substantial and meaningful stakeholder participation.” Thus far we have a battle of anecdotes, theirs against ours. They go on to
argue that:
[i]t is true that stakeholders in these cases are commonly underorganized
and vulnerable and that there are many failures of professional loyalty and
accountability. However, Sandler and Schoenbrod’s implication that structural litigation reduces the effective participation of plaintiff class members
is counterintuitive. If we assume that stakeholders are so poorly organized
and vulnerable that they cannot hold accountable the lawyers purporting to
represent them, there is no reason to expect that they would do better in
the general electoral or administrative processes.
Id. Our position may be counter-intuitive to them, but is backed by a literature arguing
that success in court is usually a lagging indicator of growing political support as advocacy organizations shift resources from litigation to political advocacy. See DEMOCRACY
BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 150-52. Sabel and Simon fail to note that members of a
plaintiff class don’t get to vote for their attorneys, but do get to vote for their legislators
and do get to fire their attorneys in individual litigation. Of course, there are classes,
such as prisoners and mental patients, that are typically denied the vote. Yet, the rights
that protect them are predominately constitutional rather than statutory in origin.
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constitutional rights and many common law and statutory rights are
negative. Another reason is that no one may know with certainty
how government will be able to achieve the right set out in the statute, not the experts, not the officials, and not the plaintiffs’ attorneys. The judicial failure to distinguish soft rights from traditional
rights, however, has resulted in the emergence of consent decrees
managed by controlling groups that have lasted twenty or thirty
years or more without ever fully achieving their initial aspirational
goals.
Our definition of soft rights is judicially manageable and is, in
any event, surely much more manageable than a rigid attempt to
compel governmental agencies to achieve aspirational goals where
there are no clear political or legislative directions, or even a consensus on how the officials might achieve compliance. As Judge
Edward R. Becker stated in commenting approvingly on our book
and its concept of soft rights, “the courts, instead of the representative branches, end up making policy choices, such as how much of
the city’s depleted budget must be spent on curb cuts over the next
two years.”74
B. State and Local Officials Cannot be Trusted, Therefore Broad
Consent Decrees are Warranted
In Frew, Justice Kennedy wrote that state officials “must be presumed to have a high degree of competence in deciding how best
to discharge their governmental responsibilities,”75 and that the
Court in its earlier Rufo opinion had “rejected the idea that the
institutional concerns of government officials were ‘only marginally
relevant’ when officials moved to amend a consent decree. . . .”76
The Court’s statements carefully balanced deference to local democracy with the judicial power to enforce rights; it plainly was not
an uncritical endorsement of state and local officials. The Court
underscored the balance it sought by stating that while judges
should defer to state and local officials, those officials must nonetheless comply with federal law as well as consent decrees that bind
them, at least until they secure appropriate modifications.
74.
75.
76.

Edward R. Becker, Of Laws and Sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7, 10 (2003).
Frew, 540 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 441.
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Any suggestion of deference to state and local elected officials
elicits a strong reaction from the proponents of consent decrees.
Poser and Tushnet,77 for example, misread our position in Democracy by Decree to be that state and local officials should be free to do
as they please. The misreading comes, we believe, from our disputing the typecasting in which the “white hats” are worn by public
interest lawyers, federal judges, and the legislators in Congress, and
the “black hats” are worn by state and local officials who fail to live
up to statutory goals. Poser reads us as turning this typecasting on
its head, making the state and local officials into heroes and the
lawyers and judges into villains.78 We do attack the typecasting, but
do not go nearly as far as she suggests.
The conventional assignment of stereotypical roles made sense
in the context of massive resistance to desegregation, but not today
when it comes to enforcement of federal statutory rights. The legislators claim hero status on the cheap by setting the pie-in-sky aspirational standards enforceable against state and local officials in
77. For example, Poser in her review of our book claims that we assume “that in
the absence of a court order, or threat of a court order, public officials would voluntarily change large public institutions” and that they “will act in good faith if given the
chance.” As should already be plain, we along with Justice Kennedy in the Frew opinion
say that state and local officials should be given a chance to show they will work in good
faith to honor rights, not that they will; if they don’t, they should be subjected to a strict
order. As Frew stated, while “the basic obligations of federal law may remain the
same. . . the precise manner of their discharge may not. If the State establishes reason
to modify the decree, the court should make the necessary changes; where it has not
done so, however, the decree should be enforced according to its terms.” Frew, 540 U.S.
at 442. Ironically, it is the defenders of democracy by decree who place unwarranted
trust on elected officials. It is their position that officials will resist overly intrusive decree provisions. But, as we explain, these officials are often only too anxious to consent
in order to get their legal problems off the front pages, gain leverage on funding, and
shift the more onerous obligations to their successors in office. See DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 122, 167-74. The reality of how consent decrees get written is a
complete answer to those who, like David Zaring, argue that the consent aspect of consent decrees solves the undemocratic aspects of institutional reform litigation. See, e.g.,
Zaring, supra note 56, at 1033.
78. Poser, supra note 56, at 1311 (“Every possible doubt about proprietary and
motivation is resolved against plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges, and in favor of local and
state government officials.”). See also id. at 1316. In fact, however, we criticize state and
local officials on a number of scores, including caving in to consent decrees that are
bad for their constituents and their successors and sometimes resisting compliance to
the point where an intrusive injunction is necessary to protect rights. See DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE, supra note 6, at 122-23, 167-74 & 204-05.
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federal court. The legislators, and often the federal agencies to
which they delegate, duck out of the inevitable, hard choices about
the extent to which it really makes sense to achieve these goals in
light of limited resources and the competing claims upon them.
The upshot is that the federal legislators stand for the public’s desire for the benefits, the state and local officials stand for the public’s resistance to the sacrifices needed to deliver the benefits, and
the controlling group gets to make the policy choices. As a by-product of vaunting themselves as rights-creating heroes, members of
Congress cast state and local officials as rights-defying villains.
This assignment of roles is phony because both sets of politicians represents a public that wants the political process to consider
the costs as well as the benefits of policy choices. Those choices
should be made by elected officials and their appointees rather
than the lawyers in the controlling group.
Mark Tushnet disagrees. For him, because Congress has in effect handed off power to the courts, that is the end of the argument: “the judicial decrees do no more than pit the expression of
one democratically responsible body—Congress (and the President)—against some others—governors and state legislatures, mayors and city councils. You can’t get any purchase from democratic
theory on how that sort of conflict should be resolved.”79 Abram
Chayes anticipated Tushnet’s would-be argument in his article, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, and dismissed it as a
formalistic analysis [that] does not begin to capture the
complexities of the way the legislature operates and of its
relations with the courts. In enacting fundamental social
and economic legislation, Congress is often unwilling or
unable to do more than express a kind of general policy
objective or orientation. Whether this be legislative abdication or not, the result is to leave a wide measure of discretion to the judicial delegate. The corrective power of
Congress is also stringently limited in practice. Only a
very few judicial aberrations will cross the threshold of political urgency needed to precipitate congressional
action.80
79.
80.

Tushnet, supra note 56, at 190.
Chayes, supra note 4, at 1314.
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A point that we add to those made by Chayes is that, by making the
hard choices that Congress ducks, the courts enable Congress to
continue to pass the sweeping, aspirational statutes that put power
in the hands of the controlling groups.81
Tushnet’s fallback is that, whatever its faults, democracy by decree might not be worse than the alternative. As he puts it, “the
interesting question is how one political process compares to the
other, in terms of democratic accountability and policy effectiveness. Sandler and Schoenbrod sketch the political process involving courts, but say almost nothing, at least directly, about the
alternative.”82 To the contrary, we say a great deal about the comparison, pointing out, for example how foster care improved in
New York City when the court refused to continue the controlling
group process, and how more than twenty years of court supervision of New York City’s special education program produced awkward and harmful results in the view of educators who were
nonetheless rebuffed by a judge who was determined to enforce a
lengthy and rigid consent decree.83 Also, our analysis of democratic accountability is explicitly posed in comparative terms.84 The
burden, it seems to us, is on Tushnet and those who advocate the
unrestricted use of consent decrees because they are propounding
a theory of judicial review in which the role of the courts is not only
to protect rights, but to take on whatever other policy objectives
that plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate into decrees.
C. The Democracy Problem in Institutional Reform Litigation is
Caused by a Hyperactive Congress, not the Well-intentioned
Lawyers and Judges
The Frew opinion accepted, as we did in Democracy by Decree,
that Congress as a national legislature may, within its constitutional
authority, establish social programs to be implemented by the
states. The Supreme Court, also as we did in Democracy by Decree,
focused on how a judge should manage the remedial stage of institutional reform litigation when the defendants are state officials
81.
82.
83.
84.
far from

See DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 17-25.
Tushnet, supra note 56, at 192.
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 45-97, 144-49, 193-94.
Id. at 154-61. Although democratic accountability of ordinary government “is
perfect, democracy by decree makes it worse.” Id. at 154.

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR307.txt

940

unknown

Seq: 26

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

25-APR-05

7:46

[Vol. 49

who bear the burden of complying with the federal statute, or as
Justice Kennedy put it when a “decree in effect mandates the State,
through its named officials, to administer a significant federal program . . . .”85
Defenders of the status quo in institutional reform litigation
note that the rights in question start with Congressional legislation,
and then make the debater’s point that therefore any effort at reform should be directed at Congress, thus taking the onus off the
judges and lawyers who control consent decrees.86 It is hard to take
seriously such comments, since those who make them often fervently advocate federal legislation and federal social programs; they
would be the first to reject efforts to reduce federal authority. We
of course see the logic of attacking federal legislation, but that diversion was not our topic in Democracy by Decree, nor was it the Supreme Court’s topic in Frew. In an academic setting one might
speculate about cabining Congress’s appetite for social legislation,
but actual efforts to reinvigorate the commerce clause, the nondelegation doctrine, or other potential constitutional limits on Congress have had at most only limited success. In our book, we take
these limits as they now are (largely unenforced) for the simple, but
powerful reason that it is a long shot that the Supreme Court will
do much with these doctrines, at least in the near term, and in the
meantime courts are faced with institutional reform cases.
In writing Democracy by Decree we relied on our own experience
both as plaintiffs attorneys and, while serving in government, as defendants bound by old consent decrees. For the book we also explored some positive examples where things had gone differently.
One case we relied on was the foster care litigation in New York City
where an experienced federal district judge, tired with his prior
fruitless, rigid consent order, permitted the City officials to advance
their own reform plan without instructions from either plaintiffs’
counsel or the court, and with the promise of termination of direct
court supervision after two years based on sustained good faith ef85. Frew, 540 U.S. at 442.
86. See, e.g., Poser, supra note 56, at 1321-23. See also Tushnet, supra note 56, at
203. Even Susan Rose-Ackerman, who is generally approving of DEMOCRACY BY DECREE,
writes that our “largely persuasive critique of current practice” in the creation of rights
by Congress should have prompted us to urge the courts to confront the practices in
Congress. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 56, at 681.
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forts at meeting legal responsibilities. The decree in fact did terminate on schedule even though the City was still far short of 100%
compliance with the array of federal, state, and local legal obligations encrusting its foster care responsibilities.87 Those reform efforts have continued to this day.88
We also based some of our proposals on one provision in the
Prison Litigation Reform Act89 that required that federal prison
condition decrees, even those entered on consent, be strictly limited to curing violations of rights, and that they terminate promptly
when no longer needed to protect such rights. It was under this
provision that the Rufo consent decree was finally terminated in
1997. The provision lets courts protect rights, without letting them
do what they shouldn’t do—make policy when not necessary to protect rights. Congress has, in effect, shifted institutional reform litigation in the prison reform arena from contract to democracy.

87. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Joel A.
v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000).
88. Sabel and Simon, supra note 56, at 1093 n.222, argue that our description of
this case shows that courts can readily discern defendants who want to fix the problem
and thereby avoid entering unnecessarily intrusive decrees. See also Tushnet, supra note
56, at 197-99. Sabel and Simon, as well as Tushnet, fail to engage our argument that the
Marisol case is the exception that proves the rule. See DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note
6, at 146, 167-74. It is exceptional because defendants stuck with a losing case generally
prefer to cave in than take responsibility.
Sabel and Simon similarly miss the forest for the tree in reacting to another case we
describe, this one involving a decades old decree controlling New York City’s multi
billion dollar special education program. Sabel & Simon, supra note 56, at 1085-86.
They report, and accurately so, that we criticized a state regulation enforced by the
decree that set a short deadline for school systems to evaluate and place students
named as possibly needing special education. The evaluation process diverted resources
from helping students to much superfluous paperwork. They then assert, and wrongly
so, that our discussion of this point belies our argument that courts in entering institutional reform cases should stick to enforcing rights and not use the decree to try to
improve public policy in other ways. The state regulation was ill-advised, but the decree
made it worse by requiring that the evaluation be done in a much more expensive way
than required by any statute or regulation. Our point is not that all statutes and regulations are good, but rather that it is bad to allow the controlling group to use the court
to, in effect, enact its own statutes and regulations.
89. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See also Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327 (2000) (upholding the constitutionality of the stay and termination provisions).
The legislative history of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is set out in our book, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 183-92.
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Our book urged the courts themselves to institute a broader range
of reforms to cover the full spectrum of institutional reform cases.90
We have tried to see institutional reform litigation in a new
light in line with contemporary realities. Our severest critics, such
as Danny Greenberg and Mark Tushnet, are still battling against the
past where officials outwardly resisted constitutional rights, attacked
the judges for doing their jobs, and demanded that the courts stay
out of the business of government altogether. They seem to hear in
any analysis of how institutional reform consent decrees are actually
managed the hoary attacks on activist judges for overstepping their
role.
Judges have not been too active, in our view, but rather that
they’ve been too passive in allowing the controlling group to borrow the powers of the court to run public policy. When Abram
Chayes in 1976 introduced the topic of institutional reform litigation to the legal academic world, he noted that the contents of the
decrees were based on trial and error, and that the whole business
was an experiment that bears watching.91 Now, almost thirty years
later, the experiment has been run, but the experimental spirit has
for some hardened into an orthodoxy. Not only are the decrees
difficult to change in light of experience, at least until the Supreme
Court spoke in Frew, but, for these critics, any suggestion for the
reform of institutional reform litigation to protect democratic values is itself dangerous. To such reaction, the unanimous reaffirmation of democratic values by the Supreme Court in Frew is a
rounded response.

90.
91.

DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 6, at 193-221.
Chayes, supra note 4, at 1313.

